Minister for Defence Industry and Minister for Pacific Island Affairs, the Hon Pat Conroy MP. Photo: ADF.
The Defence Industry Minister twice last week took the opportunity to take a swipe at defence commentators who have raised concerns about capability shortfalls and risks to major Australian Defence Force facilities.
Speaking at the Queensland Media Club in Brisbane, Mr Conroy said he wanted to “correct a narrative preferred in some quarters” over criticism of Defence’s perceived weakness in its counter-drone capabilities.
“I’d like to make the point that part of what I intend to do today is correct a narrative preferred in some quarters, including among the co-called commentariat – some of them former ADF members and Defence officials – who now make a living by providing convenient criticism,” he said.
“I’ve said it before – and will say it again now. You are entitled to your own opinion, but not your own facts.”
Former Deputy Chief of Air Force and current Chairman of the (pro-bono) Institute for Integrated Economic Research – Australia, Air Vice-Marshal (Ret’d) John Blackburn and former Commander of the Royal Australian Navy’s Fleet Air Arm and Independent Safety, Risk and System Analysis and Practitioner, Commodore Vince Di Pietro (Ret’d) highlighted in a recent insight paper the vulnerability of the naval base at HMAS Stirling in WA which will be home to US, UK and eventually Australian nuclear-powered submarines.
They said the planned Westport container terminal located just six kilometres across Cockburn Sound from this key strategic defence facility provided an opportunity for state and non-state actors to position drone systems close to the base, as well as significantly increasing marine traffic in a narrow waterway.
“Serious questions arise about co-locating a nuclear-submarine base, import terminals and dense foreign shipping traffic in a single channel access waterway, given the growth of containerised weapon systems,” they wrote in their 14 August paper.
“In 2025 we have witnessed the growth of containerised weapon systems. Both Israel and Ukraine employed drones launched from shipping containers and trucks as a tactic in their respective conflicts, demonstrating a shift towards covert and asymmetric drone warfare.
“Ukraine’s ‘Operation Spiderweb’ involved smuggling drones into Russia inside shipping containers and launching them remotely to attack Russian airfields,” they added.
“Similarly, Israel has used covert methods to smuggle drone components into Iran, establishing drone launch sites within the country. Both cases demonstrate the increasing use of covert drone operations, smuggled into enemy territory and then launched, inflicting significant damage on the enemy’s high-value targets.
“Clearly there are serious questions that need to be addressed with respect to the risks and vulnerabilities for both Defence and the WA population resulting from the collocation of a nuclear submarine base, import ports, a narrow channel and large numbers of foreign flagged commercial ships.”
Satellite imagery shows the proximity of the planned Westport to HMAS Stirling and the narrow marine waterway through Cockburn Sound. Image: Google Earth.
Their observations initially studied and, ultimately, echoed concerns that had been raised by WA Labor MP Kyle McGinn.
Shortly before quitting politics in May 2025, Mr McGinn had reportedly warned US politicians that Westport’s proximity to HMAS Stirling could present a security risk to resident US and UK nuclear-powered submarines scheduled to be based there under the AUKUS Pillar I Marine Rotational Force-West (MRF-W) construct from 2027, a claim WA Premier Roger Cook has since dismissed.
Blackburn and Di Pietro said that Federal Defence Personnel Minister Matt Keogh had also “shrugged off” these security concerns when they were raised in an article in The Australian, saying he offered essentially a “‘nothing to see here’ response”.
Mr Conroy’s observation came as he announced the government’s decade-long investment of up to $1.3 billion into counter-drone systems through Project LAND 156, primarily from Australian companies, many of which are world-leading.
Later that same week while speaking at the Hunter Defence Conference in Newcastle, Mr Conroy doubled-down on his criticism.
“I will admit to being bemused at times by the narrative that has emerged – pushed along by some people in this room – that the government is not responding to this threat,” he said on 25 August.
“Nothing could be further from the truth.
“Defence went to market in February to acquire urgent initial quantities of dismounted counter drone sensors and effectors – and four months later the first rolling-wave contracts were issued to 20 companies totalling $38.7 million, 60 per cent of which is going to Australian companies like Droneshield, Daronmont, Silentium and SouthTech Systems.”
Despite these investments, the criticism has not been without merit, with the initial funding and number of dedicated counter-drone and larger air defence systems ordered so far being little more than a drop in the ocean compared to what will be required to adequately defend ADF bases and key infrastructure from future airborne threats like drones and missiles.
Further, many of the companies Mr Conroy mentioned in both of his speeches have already sold numerous systems overseas to multiple countries long before finally cracking their own Australian market.
