If the UK grows its fleet to 12 SSN-A submarines, Australia will have the benefits of sharing development and sustainment costs across a larger fleet of vessels. Image: ADF.
The United Kingdom announced last week a vast expansion of its defence spending and capabilities as a result of a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) conducted by the new Labour Government.
A major element of the SDR’s 62 recommendations will see a doubling of the UK Royal Navy’s (RN) nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) fleet, from a planned six to 12 boats.
These submarines will be the SSN-AUKUS (SSN-A) class boat that Australia will also build at Osborne in South Australia from the early 2040s, and will replace the RN’s current Astute-class and Australia’s Collins-class and US-sourced Virginia-class SSNs.
The UK Government says the investment in 12 new submarines – which is in addition to the four Dreadnought-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) in development – will transform the UK’s nuclear submarine building industry, and sits alongside plans for a £15 billion build-up of its nuclear weapons stockpile as well.
On face value, the move to bolster the UK’s nuclear-powered submarine manufacturing capacity bodes well for Australia, in that there will be a larger global fleet of SSN-A boats among which development and sustainment costs can be spread and shared.
Further, it will increase Rolls-Royce’s nuclear reactor manufacturing capacity which has been called into question in recent years.
But conversely, and perhaps necessarily, the SDR emphasises the UK will take a “NATO First” posture in the face of increased Russian aggression and the ongoing war in Ukraine.
It says this will result in a “landmark shift in our deterrence and defence: moving to warfighting readiness to deter threats and strengthen security in the Euro Atlantic area”.
“The UK should prioritise its ability to contribute to NATO plans (including for defending the UK), which should be at the heart of capability development and force design,” it reads, adding that the UK will, “Put NATO at the centre of its force development, with a focus on shaping and meeting ambitious NATO Capability Targets designed to strengthen the alliance’s military capabilities and to improve burden-sharing between Europe and Canada on the one hand and the US on the other.”
In reference to the AUKUS construct, the SDR recommends a continuation of the plan to jointly develop the SSN-A boats.
“We will commit to continuous submarine production through investments [in industry] that will allow us to produce a submarine every 18 months,” it says.
“Through the AUKUS program, this will allow us to grow our nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet to up to 12. This will reinforce our Continuous at Sea Deterrent (CASD) and position the UK to deliver the AUKUS partnership with the US and Australia.”
Apart from these aspirations, the SDR also identifies a couple of risks to SSN-A development.
“As a multigenerational effort, the renewal of the nuclear deterrent requires long-term direction so that the MOD [UK Ministry of Defence] and industry can manage risk and improve performance and value for money over time,” it says.
To this end, it says, “Clarity is needed on how this program interacts with a wider set of demands for nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines, including the next-generation attack submarines under the AUKUS partnership.”
Therefore, it is calling on the British Government to “confirm the intended numbers of SSN attack submarines, including the next-generation attack submarines under the AUKUS partnership, to provide the necessary assumptions for the required build capacity and tempo.”
The importance of these last two points cannot be understated, as the industrial capacity to build double the number of planned submarines will take a decade or more to build, and time is of the essence.
Australia cannot grow the capacity to build its own boats alone and will need to lean heavily on the Royal Navy and companies like BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce as it grows its own workforce and shipyard in Adelaide. It is vital that the UK has sufficient capacity to provide that assistance under the AUKUS construct.
The only other mentions of AUKUS in the SDR are in reference to the multinational Global Combat Air Program (GCAP) of which Australia has shown early interest but is not a partner, and a range of Pillar 2 capabilities such as AI and autonomous systems.
